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2ABSTRACT
An approach is proposed in which fault detection and diagnosis (FDD) tasks are
distributed to separate FDD modules associated with each control system located
throughout a plant.  Intended specifically for those control systems that inherently
eliminate steady state error, it is modular, steady state based, requires very little
process specific information and therefore should be attractive to control systems
implementers who seek economies of scale.  The approach is applicable to virtually
all types of process plant, whether they are open loop stable or not, have a type or
class number of zero or not and so on.  Based on qualitative reasoning, the approach is
founded on the application of control systems theory to single and cascade control
systems with integral action.  This results in the derivation of cause-effect knowledge
and fault isolation procedures that take into account factors like interactions between
control systems, and the availability of non-control-loop-based sensors. 
31. INTRODUCTION
For the sake of both economy and safety, online process monitoring, fault detection
and fault diagnosis have received significant attention in recent years.  Becraft and
Guo et al. (1991) have surveyed a number of methods pertaining to fault diagnosis
and have pointed out that each method manages to capture or model some subset of
the features of diagnostic reasoning about operating conditions, and thus may be more
suitable than other techniques for a particular class of problem.  Although a lot of
approaches have since been developed, still none can be viewed as having general
applicability. Heuristic methods are fast and do not require a plant model, but are
comparatively brittle because they cannot handle situations that are not explicitly
anticipated.  Model-based techniques are less brittle, but pose other problems: most
industrial chemical processes are unique, it is expensive to build high-fidelity first-
principles models of these processes and very difficult to anticipate all the abnormal
situations that might arise; neural network based methods require considerable data
and long training times and might have difficulty in diagnosing novel faults.  
The main motivation for the development of the method described here is to provide a
distributed scheme, because virtually all the other methods take a centralised view in
that design & analysis are normally carried out from the top, say from a plant
schematic, and FDD tasks are implemented centrally on something like a DCS
Supervisor. This appears to be contrary to current developments: to exploit economies
of scale, “economic pressures are dispersing machine intelligence away from
centralized computers toward distributed (Fieldbus) devices “ (Clarke, 1995).  If one
looks at the measurements collected from a process plant, a large proportion relate to
the control loops, the rest are largely collected to ensure that operation is within
allowable constraints. Since the hardware modules associated with these control loops
are distributed throughout the plant, it seems sensible to distribute associated
detection & diagnosis tasks in a similar manner. The role of each of these detection &
diagnosis modules would not be confined to the validation of the performance of the
closed loops, each module would also monitor the performance of the process located
in the proximity of these loops. The boundaries specified for individual module
responsibilities are likely to overlap one another so their union should encompass the
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mathematical models.  This would facilitate common software that could be
configured at the same time as individual loops were tuned.  Clearly these economies
of scale would be diminished if the algorithms were too plant specific and required
knowledge not readily available from the plant.
Such a vision will not be realised easily.  Considerable research and debate are
required before practicable implementations evolve.  The method described here is a
contribution towards this goal.  Its novelty lies in its focus on the control system and
on how it responds, in the steady state, to faults and disturbances in both the control
system and in the local plant.  Thus the focus is on distribution.  It has many
limitations and issues of implementation have yet to be addressed.  However it might
be appropriate for many process plants particularly those under standard single or
cascade PID control.  Some of the limitations are as follows:
(1)  the controllers themselves must perform to specification and all control loops must
guarantee zero steady state error e.g. because they have integral action;
(2)  the fault must remain until a new steady state is reached and that this change in
steady state must be detected;
(3)  multiple faults can only be diagnosed if they are separated either spatially, i.e. in
different parts of the plant, or temporarily, i.e. a new steady state is arrived at
before the next fault occurs;
(4)  reasoning is performed qualitatively and hence no quantitative results are obtained;
(5)  controller outputs, together with measurements of the control variables must be
available as observations.
A likely communications architecture is shown in Figure 1.  The detection &
diagnosis modules are called SEVACS to highlight a possible relationship with SEVA
components as described by Henry and Clarke (1993) and by Clarke (1995).  Note
that the approach has two components, a distributed component (SEVACS) and a
central component (the FDD Supervisor).  In the distributed component, candidate
sets of faults and disturbances would be hypothesised by reasoning qualitatively about
how steady state deviations, observed in the control system, might have been caused.
This reasoning process is based on qualitative equations derived for that particular
form of control system.  In the central component, the candidate sets generated by the
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which take into account known interactions between control systems and sign
information output from the SEVACS. 
It is envisioned that this approach would be implemented in two stages, as part of the
(offline) design stage and then, online, during commissioning.  At the offline stage the
plant would be decomposed into manageable compartments and each control system
would be considered in turn.  The following characteristics would then be
identified/hypothesised for each control system:
• its structure, i.e. whether it has a standard form like a single loop or double,
cascade loops or whether a new special form has to be recognised;
• the process Type Number (Dorf and Bishop, 1995) (if known);
• open loop stability (if known);
• steady state gains between interacting loops (if known).
Based on these characteristics, an appropriate configuration would then be
downloaded to each of the detection & diagnosis modules.  During commissioning,
online procedures would then be executed to obtain those items above that were still
unknown.  In addition the modules would be configured to detect changes in steady
state and the FDD supervisor would be specified.
SEVACS Modules
In the approach proposed here fault isolation is achieved by reasoning about steady
state deviations in measured variables by referring to cause-effect knowledge of
individual control systems.  Section 2 analyses how standard control systems respond
to faults and disturbances, in general, by referring to linear control systems theory and
to signed-directed-graph (SDG) representations.  Both linear and weakly non-linear
(i.e. linearisable) processes are considered.  Section 3 describes the cause-effect
knowledge that can be generated from this analysis, and which can be downloaded to
the various modules.  Issues of generality, in terms of the diversity of disturbances
and non-linearities, are discussed in the Conclusions.
6FDD Supervisor   
It is envisioned that the SEVACS modules would output analyses every time the
process obtained a new steady state.  By applying a choice of reasoning processes that
are based on a search & test strategy described in Sections 4 & 5, the Supervisor
would then fuse these analyses to isolate the cause.  The level of isolation depends on
the knowledge available and SDGs can facilitate this.  The procedure described in
Section 4 is somewhat specific, a more general, but more complicated, procedure is
offered in Section 5 as an alternative.  The approach is demonstrated using a simple
CSTR example in Section 6.
Steady State Change Detection  
The approach depends on the availability of procedures to detect a change in steady
state.  Although this problem is not new (see for instance, Cao and Rhinehart, 1995,
1997; Theilliol et al., 1995), it is not clear whether steady state identifiers have been
implemented successfully on a large scale plant.  Albers (1997) has discussed the
application of steady state identifiers to data reconciliation and error detection, whilst
workers on real-time optimisers (see for instance, Pierucci et al., 1996) and PCA (see
for instance, Vedam and Venkatasubramanian, 1999) do not comment on the issue.
Figure 2b shows the kind of output that is sought: the temperature data of figure 2a
has been converted into a time series of R-statistics (Cao and Rhinehart, 1995, 1997),
which in turn has been analysed by applying a hypothesis test to detect if a change has
occurred; this has then been automatically interpreted into the more meaningful form
shown.  The key to figure 2b is as follows: level 3 occurs when it is not possible to
make a decision because of insufficient data at that time, level 2 arises when no-
decision is available because the plant is not in a steady state, levels ±1 arise when a
new steady state is deemed to have been obtained (the sign denotes the direction),
level 0 is obtained when this new steady state is ‘accepted’ and the test procedure is
reset.  Thus the change in steady state, which can be observed in figure 2a, is detected
about 1 hour later (figure 2b) and the deviation is negative in direction.  
The steady state requirement is quite demanding.  Fortunately this requirement can be
loosened, at least in one aspect, that of long settling times, which have the potential to
render the approach impracticable.  An early decision on responses with long settling
7times can be made, provided asymptotic trajectories can be detected as such.
Another issue is that of time delays.  Being steady state based, the concept is
independent of any time delays in the plant.  However time delays are likely to make
steady state change detection more difficult, increase the time before a new steady
state can be identified and cause confusions, for instance if one part is deemed to be in
steady state whilst another is not.  Although important, these issues were outside the
scope of the work described here.
Background
A considerable amount of literature has been published about fault detection and
diagnosis.  The focus here is on the two most relevant aspects: on distributing
diagnostic tasks to control systems and on those non-distributed methods that might
be viewed as having some similarities with the approach described here.
Little has been written about distributing diagnostic tasks presumably because
traditionally, the diagnostic engineer’s view of feedback control is that it complicates,
rather than aids, diagnostic reasoning.  Feedback control adds to the complexity of
fault detection in process plants by masking measurement deviations that might
indicate a fault, and by making it difficult to distinguish between a sensor, actuator, or
plant failure (Henry and Clarke, 1993).  Control systems offer little decision-making
assistance to an operator during the occurrence of process faults or abnormal
disturbances, and in many cases, the actions of the control system can mask
manifestations of the fault that would aid the operator in determining the cause of the
process fault (Wilcox and Himmelblau, 1994a, 1994b). A similar research activity is
that of control loop performance monitoring (Harris, 1989; Desborough & Harris,
1992; Stenfelj et al., 1993; Tyler et al., 1996; Thornhill et al., 1999; Kesavan et al.,
1997).  This differs from that proposed here because it focuses solely on the control
loop.  Other researchers seek to partition FDD tasks as opposed to distribute them.
See for instance, Finch & Kramer (1988) and Prasad et al (1998) who examine ways
in which diagnostic knowledge can be structured for large scale process systems.  It is
difficult to see how ‘distributed’ versions of many techniques could be obtained: for
instance multivariable statistical process control (MSPC), gross error detection and
data reconciliation (Rollins and Davis, 1992; Crowe, 1996; MacGregor and Kourti,
1995; Tong and Crowe, 1995; Albuquerque & Biegler, 1996; Heyen et al., 1996;
8Schraa and Crowe, 1996; Bagajewicz & Jiang, 1997; Bakshi, 1998; Dunia and Qin,
1998; Luo et al., 1998; Jiang et al., 1999; Martin and Morris et al., 1999; Nounou and
Bakshi, 1999; Sanchez et al., 1999; Shao et al., 1999). An alternative avenue of
research that might be worth pursuing is based on neural networks and wavelets (see
for instance non-distributed approaches by Rengaswamy and Venkatasubramanian
(1995), Vedam and Venkatasubramanian (1997), Chen et al. (1999) and Wang et al.
(1999)). 
Based on qualitative reasoning, the proposed approach has been developed, in part, by
referring to SDG representations of control systems.  Although the application of
SDG-based reasoning to fault diagnosis is not new, previous work has focused on the
process plant, with its associated control and sensory systems, as a single entity (e.g.
Shiozaki et al., 1984; Tsuge et al., 1984a, 1984b; Kramer and Palowitch, 1987;
Kutsuwa et al., 1988; Mo et al.,1997).  Although not directly relevant because the
approach cannot be distributed, it is interesting that Vedam and Venkatasubramanian
(1999) have developed a hybrid approach based on PCA and SDG because PCA is a
steady-state based approach. Wang et al. (1995) have applied fuzzy qualitative
reasoning method to assess process plants whilst Lunze and Schiller (1999) have
explored fault diagnosis based on qualitative and probabilistic logic models.  Finally
the reader is referred to Chantler et al. (1998), which is considered noteworthy
because it outlines various implementations that have been examined in realistic
situations.
Long-term Vision
Looking into the future Figure 3 summarises the overall procedure that might be
applied if the approach was to be implemented on a large scale plant.
 
 
92. REPRESENTATIONAL ISSUES FOR SEVACS KNOWLEDGE
GENERATION
This section examines various ways that cause-effect knowledge can be represented to
facilitate its generation.  The first step is to introduce nomenclature relating to block
diagram representations of two standard control systems (Section 2.1).  These block
diagrams are then analysed in Section 2.2 to produce equations that can generate
cause-effect knowledge.  An alternative representation (based on SDGs) is then
considered in Section 2.3.
2.1 Nomenclature
The various variables used are defined before going any further.  A simple single loop
control system is represented by the block diagram shown in Figure 4: all variables
represent deviations, θr is the deviation in the set-point/reference variable, θ in the
controlled variable,  dm in the sensor bias, dv in the valve bias,  dp in the process
disturbance and x in the controller output. Parameter Kc is the proportional gain of the
controller and parameters Kv, Kp and Kd are respectively the valve, process and
process disturbance steady state gains. Gc(s), Gv(s), Gp(s) and Gd(s) are transfer
functions of the controller, valve, process and disturbance respectively.  Note that this
structure represents only one form of PID control.  Although other ways of
implementing standard three-term control, e.g. as PI-D or I-PD, would result in
different structures, all would lead to the same results because the approach is steady
state based. Variables that pertain to a cascade control system are defined in a similar
way (Figure 5).  The approach described here is based on an analysis of qualitative
variables that assumes that the basic qualitative operations are as defined in Table 1: a
qualitative variable [x] is merely defined as the sign of variable x (De Kleer & Brown,
1984; Forbus, 1984). In comparison with its normal or nominal value, [x] has  four
qualitative values: ‘+’ means x deviates high; ‘−’ means x deviates low; ‘0’ means x
has no change and ‘?’ means the deviation of x cannot be decided.
In order to implement qualitative operations, another definition is required: {K}
represents the sign of the gain K and can be viewed as an operator. Qualitative
operator {K} only has two values: ‘+’ when K>0 and ‘−’ when K<0. The operation
{K} is defined as follows:
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{−K1}=−{K1};
{+K1}=+{K1}={K1};
−{−K1}={K1};
{K1K2}={K1}{K2}={K2}{K1};
{K1/K2}={K1K2}.
2.2 Generation Of SEVACS Inter-Node Relationships
This sub-section examines how faults and process disturbances can affect individual
control systems, the results are then used to construct SDG representations in the next
sub-section.  Only the main ideas are given here, a more comprehensive explanation
can be found in Chen (2000).  The processes under control must first be categorised in
two ways: open loop stable or not, has a Type Number of zero or not.  The most
common of these is considered here, Appendix 1 describes all the other cases.
2.2.1 Open loop stable processes with zero Type Number
Consider the PID control system block diagram shown in Figure 4 and assume that,
when linearised
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In the steady state, and if the controller functions as expected,
θ=θr-dm (8)
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Qualitatively, we have:
 [θ]=[θr]-[dm] (11)
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steady state gain Kd in Figure 4.
Similarly the cascade control system in Figure 5 can be analysed to obtain the
following equations:
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where subscripts containing a 1 pertain to the outer loop controller and those with a 2
pertain to the inner loop, 
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 can be viewed as the steady state gain Kp1, 
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 can be
viewed as the steady state gain Kp2 , 
01
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A
D
 can be viewed as the steady state gain Kd1,
and 
02
02
A
D
 can be viewed as the steady state gain Kd2.
2.2.2 Analysis Of  Inter-Node Relationships
The focus here is on the single loop.  A similar approach can be taken for the cascade
case.  If the Routh-Hurwitz Criterion were to be applied to the closed loop equations,
then one of the necessary conditions for closed loop stability would be KcKvB0>0.
If the process has an odd number of open loop unstable poles, then A0<0, so that
{A0}=− and [θr] or [dm] can cause [x] to take the opposite direction compared to a
stable process where A0>0; if the process has an even number of open loop unstable
poles, then A0>0 and {A0}=+, [θr] or [dm] has the same effect on [x] compared to the
stable process.  In both cases, and for both stable and unstable processes, deviations in
[dv] or [dp] will have the same effect on [x].
The directions of the deviations in the various observations can provide additional
information with which to infer the ‘direction’ of the various fault hypotheses e.g.
“fails-high” or “fails-low”.  If the process has a pure integrator, [x] will depend on
deviations [dv] and [dp] and deviations in  [θr] and [dm] are irrelevant.
2.3 Representing Control Systems By SDGs
An SDG can be viewed as an ordered pair, (G, s).  Directed graph G can be
represented as an ordered quadruple (N, B, i, t) consisting a set of nodes N, a set of
branches B, and two incidence functions i and t which map the branches to their initial
and terminal nodes, respectively.  The second component of the pair (G, s) is a
function which maps the branches of B to the set {+, –}. The state of a system is
described qualitatively by a pattern p which is a function from the nodes of the graph
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to the set {+, 0, –}. A node mapping to qualitative value +, 0 or – indicates that the
corresponding process variable is high, normal or low respectively. 
An example of a SDG representation is shown in Figure 6.  Here nodes D, E or F can
be mapped to deviations DD, DE and DF, all of which can take qualitative values +, 0
or – to indicate that the corresponding process variable is high, normal or low
respectively.
In Figure 6, the circles around nodes D and E indicate that these nodes are measured;
hence node F, which is not circled, is unmeasured.  In this paper, ancestors of a node
refer to those nodes that can cause this node to change or deviate.  Descendants of a
node refer to those nodes that can be caused to change or deviate because this node
deviates.  For example, in Figure 6, node D can be viewed as an ancestor of node E
and node E can be viewed as a descendant of node D.  Also note that each element of
set B can be defined as a relation between an initial (or an ancestor) node to a terminal
(or a descendant) node, e.g. b1 is also a relation RDE between node D and node E, and
so on.   Further background to SDG representations is given in Appendix 2.
Signed-directed-graph representations of control systems can be formed according to
the equations and qualitative information given in the last sub-section.  Figure 7(A)
shows an SDG representation of a typical single loop control system, in which C, V,
X and M represent the controller output, the valve opening, the controlled variable
and the sensor measurement respectively; θr, dv, dp, dm represent deviations in set-
point, valve bias, process disturbance and sensor bias respectively. Signs of the
branches in the SDG are determined from the relevant equations. 
It is important to note that only dp and node X interact with nodes or variables in other
parts of the plant. To indicate this, the circled parts in Figure 7(A) can be lumped
together and the figure can be simplified to Figure 7(B): θr and C are lumped into C
node, dv and V are lumped into V node, M and X are lumped into S node, and dp is
replaced by E, which is generalised to include exogenous disturbances and other
process variables.  Individual elements should still be treated separately when
performing fault diagnosis.  The whole control system can be viewed as a super-node
that consists of several nodes that form a circle.  This super-node can be analysed
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using control system related cause-effect knowledge that will be discussed in the next
section. 
A standard cascade control system can be treated in a similar way. Figure 8 shows a
cascade control system where C1, C2, V, S2 and S1 represent the output of the outer
loop controller, the output of the inner loop controller, the valve opening, the inner
loop sensor node and the outer loop sensor node respectively. Nodes E1 and E2
represent outer loop process disturbances and inner loop process disturbances
respectively. The entire cascade control system can be viewed as a super-node in
which individual elements are treated separately when performing fault diagnosis.
Only nodes S1 and S2 of the super-node can interact with other nodes or variables in
the plant. 
It is worth pointing out that, as has been discussed, for stability the sign product of
any of the control loops in the above SDGs must be ‘−’.  
3. SEVACS CAUSE-EFFECT KNOWLEDGE
Results from the previous section can now be applied to generate tables of cause-
effect knowledge, which can be downloaded to the SEVACS.  The contents of the
tables differ depending on whether or not the process has a Type Number of zero.
Here the focus is on controlled processes with a Type Number of zero, the other case
is given in Appendix 3.  Equations (8) — (14) were referred to extensively when
deriving this knowledge. Tables 2 and 3 describe the various effects that individual
faults would have on the observations available for single loop and cascade loop
control systems respectively. Faults like a dead sensor, or a sticking valve or a large
process disturbance are not considered because, in these circumstances the steady
state is unlikely to be obtained. These faults would be addressed by using other
approaches. The following sub-sections discuss how the signs of the fault or
disturbance (e.g. high or low) would be determined.
A sensor bias in a single loop control system or in the outer loop of a cascade control
system. If the sensor biases, the controller will take action to compensate for this with
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the net effect that there will be a deviation in the controller output and the sensor
measurement will return to its normal value.  The direction of the sensor bias can then
be determined by looking at the following (Figure 9):
• Rsc: the relation between the sensor measurement and the controller output;
• Dc: the steady state deviation of the controller output.
The various possibilities are listed in the decision table in Figure 9. 
A sensor bias in the inner loop of a cascade control system.  Both the inner and the
outer loop controllers will attempt to compensate (Figure 10) with the net effect that
the sensor deviation observed (Ds) will have the same direction as the (inner) sensor
bias. The decision table in the Figure 10 summarises this.
An exogenous/ancestor fault or disturbance.  In both single and cascade loop cases,
such occurrences will be compensated by the controllers with the net effect that there
will be a deviation in the controller outputs. The direction of the exogenous/ancestor
fault or disturbance can then be determined by looking at the following:
• R*: the relation between a sensor measurement and a controller output;
• Rex: the relation between an exogenous variable and a sensor measurement;
• D*: the steady state deviation in a controller output.
Although these 3 factors refer to the various loops differently (see Figure 11) the
various outcomes can be represented in a single decision table as shown.
A Valve bias.  If the valve biases, there will be a deviation in the controller output
with the effect that the sensor measurement will return to its normal value. The
direction of the valve bias can then be determined by looking at the following factors
(Figure 12):
• Rcv: the relation between the controller output and the valve opening;
• Dc: the steady state deviation in the controller output.
The possible outcomes are as shown in the table in Figure 12.
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4. FAULT ISOLATION
It is very easy to isolate faults like a dead sensor or a large exogenous
fault/disturbance or a sticking valve, by applying appropriate simple heuristic rules.  It
is more difficult to isolate faults like a sensor bias, or a small exogenous
fault/disturbance.  In these circumstances, the controlled variable, and its effect on
descendants, is arguably the key to fault isolation: with a sensor bias, the controlled
variable will deviate from its nominal value and descendants of the controlled
variable will be affected; with a valve bias, or with an exogenous fault/disturbance,
the controlled variable will remain at its nominal value and its descendants will not
be affected.  This fault isolation principle leads to a search and test strategy composed
of two alternative strategies, the choice between them depending on whether or not
any two measured (i.e. circled) nodes interact bi-directionally and on whether or not
these relationships are actually ‘invoked’ when a particular fault arises.  This can be
programmed as a combination of operations on sets and on if-then-else rules.
4.1 Control Systems with Uni-directional Interactions
A simple set of rules can be derived for those control systems with uni-directional
interactions that have the fairly general feature shown in Figure 13. Of importance
here are the relationships between a controlled variable and its neighbouring
measured nodes: S1 is a controlled variable, S2 is a measured descendant of S1 (it
could be another controlled variable), E1 is an ancestor of both S1 and S2 (as their
process disturbance), it affects S1 and S2 simultaneously, E2 is an ancestor of S1 and
only affects S1. Thus S1-sensor-bias should be viewed as a process disturbance to S2,
the descendant of S1.
If S1 pertains to a Type Number 0 controlled process and its control loop deviates
(any element in the control loop deviates), then, initially, the fault candidate will be
{S1-sensor-bias, E1, E2, valve-bias in the S1 control loop}. There are now two
possibilities:
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• S2 is affected: because E1 is the common ancestor of S1 and S2 and according to
the fault isolation principle, the fault candidate set shrinks to {S1-sensor-bias, E1};
if the direction of the deviation of S2 contradicts that expected from the S1-sensor-
bias, {E1} is the only fault route. 
• S2 is not affected: the fault candidate set shrinks to {E2, valve-bias in the S1
control loop}. If there is no more information about E2, then these two possibilities
can not be separated. Otherwise, if E2’s descendants deviate, E2 will be the only
fault route.
It should be noted that when S2 is in another control loop, if that controller deviates,
S2 should be viewed as being affected, though the sensor measurement of S2 itself
doesn’t deviate. 
If S1 is pertaining to a Type Number > 0 controlled process instead then, although S1-
sensor-bias doesn’t cause the S1 control system to deviate, it causes S1 descendants to
deviate. Therefore in this case, only the valve-bias in the S1 control loop and the S1
process disturbances such as E1 and E2 can cause S1 control loop to deviate,   S1-
sensor-bias cannot be deduced from the deviation of any element in the S1 control
loop but from the deviation of S2, the S1 descendant.
4.2 Control Systems with Bi-directional Interactions
Here the controlled variables S1 and S2 affect each other (Figure 14); either can
pertain to a single loop (s.l.) control system or to the inner loop (i.l.) or to the outer
loop (o.l.) of a cascade control system.  Then three different types of interactions must
be considered: Type A interaction occurs when a controlled variable deviation in
either a s.l. or o.l. affects the steady state performance of another s.l. or o.l. or vice
versa.  Similarly Type B interaction occurs when there is a bi-directional interaction
between two control systems with one, and only one, of the inner loops affected.
Type C interaction occurs when both inner loops are affected (i.e. not the outer loops).
Note that the treatment of single and outer loops is the same because, in the latter, the
non-interacting inner loop can be viewed as a virtual valve node.  This can be seen in
Figure 15 where V2′ is a virtual valve node.
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4.2.1 Type A Interaction: Solely Single/Outer Loops Interact 
Referring to Figure 15, S1 is one controlled variable that is controlled by the
controller C1 and manipulated by the valve/actuator V1; S21 is the other controlled
variable that interacts with S1, here S21 is controlled by a cascade control system that
includes an outer loop controller C21 and an inner loop controller C22, S22 is as the
inner loop controlled variable, V2 is as the manipulated valve/actuator. Nodes C22,
S22 and V2 can be lumped together as a super-node V2′ (as a virtual valve node) so
that this cascade control system can be viewed or analysed as a single loop control
system. RS1S21 and RS21S1 represent the relations (or interactions) between the two
controlled variables S1 and S21.
First consider the case that all the controlled processes belong to Type Number 0
processes. If only one of the control systems deviates, then the fault is local to that
control system so the fault can be isolated using the method above; if both the control
systems deviate, there are two possibilities:
• if S1 and S21 have at least one common ancestor, the fault candidate set is {S1-
sensor-bias, S21-sensor-bias, one of the common ancestors’ faults};
• if S1 and S21 have no common ancestor, the fault candidate set is {S1-sensor-bias,
S21-sensor-bias}.
If signs of {RS1S21} and {RS21S1} are opposite, S1-sensor-bias and S2-sensor-bias can
now be separated by the knowledge related to the two control systems, as shown in
Table 4; otherwise they cannot be separated without further information.  Referring to
Figure 7(B), Table 4 has been derived by modifying and subsequently analysing
Equation (12) for each controller: just simply replacing its [dp] term with a compound
disturbance term that consists of the effect of the sensor bias in the other control
system (Chen, 2000).  
If either or both the S1 controlled process and the S21 controlled process are
capacitive, both sensor biases above cannot cause both control systems to deviate.
However one sensor bias can be viewed as a process disturbance to the other
controlled process and cause the respective control system to deviate; if both
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controlled systems deviate, there must be at least one common ancestor, which is the
fault. 
4.2.2 Type B Interaction: The Inner Loop of Only One of The Control Systems
Interacts
For Type B interaction, a single control loop or the outer loop of a cascade control
system interacts with an inner loop of a cascade control system. For example, in
Figure 16, S1 is a single loop controlled variable that is controlled by controller C1
and manipulated by valve/actuator V1. Node S1 interacts with S22, where S22 is the
inner loop controlled variable in a cascade control system in which C21 is the outer
loop controller, C22 is the inner loop controller, S21 is the outer loop controlled
variable and V2 represents the valve/actuator of the control system. RS1S22 and RS22S1
represent the relations (or interactions) between the two controlled variables S1 and
S22. Node E2 represents the process disturbance to S21.
For convenience, suppose there is no common ancestor between the two control
systems. Here a sensor bias on S1 can be viewed as an external disturbance/fault to
the inner loop of the cascade control system, but an inner loop sensor bias on S22 has
no effect on the single control system in the steady state. An external disturbance/fault
to the outer loop of the cascade control system, say E2 in Figure 16, or a sensor bias
on S21 can cause the single loop control system to deviate. 
So, S1-sensor-bias, S22-sensor-bias, E2 or S21-sensor-bias can be isolated no matter
what the relations between S1 and S22 are. For example, suppose all controlled
processes here are not capacitive, if only C21 deviates, S22-sensor-bias is the fault; if
only C1 and C22 deviate, S1-sensor-bias is the fault; if C1, C21, C22 deviate, E2 or
S21-sensor-bias is the fault. The fault directions can be inferred from the cause-effect
knowledge described previously.
It is worth pointing out that the knowledge or rules above will be different if some of
the controlled processes are capacitive. However faults can still be isolated: if the S1
controlled process is capacitive, S1-sensor-bias will not cause C1 to deviate but it can
affect the cascade control system and only cause C22 to deviate; if the inner loop
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controlled process is capacitive, C22 cannot be affected by E2 or S21-sensor-bias; if
the outer loop controlled process is capacitive, C1 cannot be affected by S21-sensor-
bias.
4.2.3 Type C Interaction: Inner Loops of Both Cascade Control Systems Interact
A Type C interaction is shown in Figure 17: one inner loop controlled variable S12
interacts with the other inner loop controlled variable S22. Node S12 is the inner loop
controlled variable in a cascade control system in which C11 is the outer loop
controller, C12 is the inner loop controller, S11 is the outer loop controlled variable
and V1 represents the valve/actuator of the control system. Node S22 is the inner loop
controlled variable in the other cascade control system in which C21 is the outer loop
controller, C22 is the inner loop controller, S21 is the outer loop controlled variable
and V2 represents the valve/actuator of the control system. RS12S22 and RS22S12 represent
the relations (or interactions)  between the two controlled variables S12 and S22.
Node E1 represents the process disturbance to S11 and E2 represents the process
disturbance to S21.
Again, for convenience, suppose there is no common ancestor between the two
control systems. The inner loop sensor bias of one cascade control system will not
affect the other cascade control system in the steady state. First consider the situation
in which the controlled processes here are not capacitive. If only C11 deviates, S12-
sensor-bias is a possible fault; if only C21 deviates, S22-sensor-bias is a possible
fault. An outer loop process disturbance or outer loop sensor bias of one cascade
control system can cause the other system to deviate,   in which case the fault can be
isolated using the following:  if C11, C12 and C22 deviate, S11-sensor-bias or E1 is a
possible fault; if C21, C22 and C12 deviate, S21-sensor-bias or E2 is a possible fault.
Once again, the above faults directions can be inferred from the cause-effect
knowledge.
The knowledge or rules above will be also different if some of the controlled
processes are capacitive: if the S12 inner loop controlled process is capacitive, C12
cannot be affected by E1 or S11-sensor-bias; if the S11 outer loop controlled process
is capacitive, C22 cannot be affected by S11-sensor-bias; if the S22 inner loop
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controlled process is capacitive, C22 cannot be affected by E2 or S21-sensor-bias; if
the S21 outer loop controlled process is capacitive, C12 cannot be affected by S21-
sensor-bias.
5.  AN ALTERNATIVE FAULT ISOLATION METHOD FOR INTERACTING
CONTROL SYSTEMS
The procedures described in the last section require different knowledge or rules for
different processes.  This section describes an alternative approach that is easier to
realise as an auto-reasoning algorithm in a real-time fault diagnosis system. It does
not rely on a large number of rules. The approach is to modify the SDG representation
of interacting control systems by breaking the interaction between two control
systems, and then to use the knowledge relating to the single or cascade control
systems to isolate the faults. Thus the effect of one control system on the other is
viewed as a process disturbance to that control system.  Having modified the relevant
SDGs, the fault isolation procedures of Section 4 can now be applied to individual
controllers as before.  Having isolated a fault, and if this fault is identified by more
than one controller, then this fault hypothesis would be accepted provided that
associated signs do not contradict.  The rest of this section examines each type of
interaction in turn.
• The SDG of two control systems with Type A interaction in Figure 15 can be
modified as shown in Figure 18.  The sensor biases ( i.e. S1 bias and S21 bias) are
represented by special process disturbances. Then {R*S1S1} and {R*S21S21} are
always + unless the process pertaining to S1 or S21 is capacitive; if the process
pertaining to S1 is capacitive , the link R*S1S1 simply doesn’t exist; if the process
pertaining to S21 is capacitive, the link R*S21S21 doesn’t exist. R*S1S21 and R*S21S1
depend on the relation between S1 and S21.  For example if S1 sensor biases high,
then the respective controlled variable will be controlled at a value less than its
nominal value and controlled variable S2 will see this effect as a negative going
disturbance.  It follows that, if the relations between S1 and S21 are as shown in
Figure 15, then {R*S1S21} = −{RS1S21} and {R*S21S1}= −{RS21S1}. 
• The SDG of two control systems with Type B interaction in Figure 16 can be
modified as shown in Figure 19.  Again the sensor biases ( i.e. S1 bias and S21
bias) are represented by special process disturbances.  Variable E2 is represented
as an exogenous disturbance to both S1 and S21 because, although E2 affects S21
directly, it affects S1 indirectly via C22 and S22. Suppose the relation between S1
and S22 is as shown in Figure 17 so that {RS1S22}, {RS22S1}, {RE2S21}, {RS22S21} are
known, then {R*S21S1}, {R*S21S21}, {R*E2S1}, {R*S1S1}, {R*S1S22} can be determined by
the following:
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 CSTR EXAMPLE
igure 21: there are two outlets, the flow rate, F1, is
hilst a nominally constant flow rate, F, is drawn for
perature, T, is maintained by varying the flow rate,
lled in the CSTR and, in addition, concentration CA
hat contrived to enable bi-directional interaction
s.  A detailed description, including nomenclature is
derived for the hypothetical CSTR relatively easily,
time and expense of developing detailed models for
eflect our desire for generality, the approach here
athematical models.  Referring to the Introduction
 be obtained:
from Figure 21 that the CSTR has three control
de;
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• the process Type Number and steady state gains: this minimum knowledge can
either be obtained from a very simple mathematical model or from a process step
test;
• open loop stability: from step tests.
Details of step test procedures can be found in Chen (2000).  A simple SDG
representation can be constructed, which is based on the above information.  Figure
22 shows the SDG for the stable CSTR.  Clearly if knowledge does exist then it
would be a nonsense not to refer to it since greater fault isolation resolution would be
obtained.  In fact one can envisage a situation where, although a plant is
commissioned with minimal knowledge, further knowledge is obtained with
operational experience.  Figure 23 shows a detailed SDG representation to reflect this
increase in knowledge.  This SDG has been constructed from steady state balances
derived from the equations given in the Appendix 4.  Note that there are three control
systems (enclosed by dashed lines), two of which have single loops, the other has a
cascade arrangement.  Controller gains can either be forward or reverse acting (see
Tables A.3 & A.4).  When examining the unstable case, a number of changes have to
be made because all the signs of the branches that take node T as their terminal node
have to be inverted. It is assumed that the output from each circled node can be
recorded either because it can be measured, as is usually the case for sensors, or
because it has been calculated, as in the case of a digital control output.  A list of
faults considered is given in Table 5 together with their consequent deviations in the
various measurements that can be recorded.  These were obtained from a simulation
constructed on the basis of the equations given in Appendix 4.
Fault 1:  L-sensor-bias-high.  If L sensor biases, then in the steady state all control
systems will deviate. From Figure 22, both the level and the flow rate control systems
have single loops and the interaction between L and F is of Type A.  Initially the fault
candidate set is {L-sensor-bias, F-sensor-bias, high-CA, an unknown disturbance of L
and F}. In addition the effects between L and F are opposite (Table 5) so that F-
sensor-bias should be rejected and L-sensor-bias-high has been deduced. Note that the
other two elements still remain. L-sensor-bias-high can then be further confirmed or
inferred from the relation between the level and temperature control systems and then
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high-CA and the unknown disturbance should be also common disturbances of F, L
and T.   Now consider the case where additional knowledge is available e.g. in the
form of Figure 23: note first that a common disturbance to F, L and T doesn’t exist
and hence L-sensor-bias-high is the only fault that can be diagnosed.  The fault can be
also isolated using the alternative fault isolation method by constructing the simple,
modified Type A SDG shown in Figure 24.  Here L-sensor-bias and F-sensor-bias can
both be viewed as process disturbances to L and F.  The LC deviation (-) implies that
the fault candidate set could be {L-sensor-bias-high, F-sensor-bias-high} whilst the
FC deviation (-) implies that the fault candidate set could be {L-sensor-bias-high, F-
sensor-bias-low}. So L-sensor-bias-high is the only possible fault that matches both
possibilities.
Fault 2: T-sensor-bias-high.  If T sensor biases, then in the steady state both the outer
loop and the inner loop controllers of the temperature cascade control system will
deviate.  However neither the level control system nor the flow rate control system
will be affected although concentration CA will also deviate.  It is worth noting that, if
the temperature is open loop unstable, then the controller deviations will be opposite
to those of the stable case. From Figure 22 and according to the cascade control loop
deviations in Table 9, initially the fault candidate set could be {T-sensor-bias-high,
high-CA, an unknown common disturbance of T and CA}.  If further information is
known (Figure 23), then although variable F0 is a common disturbance of CA and T, it
can be removed from the candidate set because L controller doesn’t deviate so neither
does its ancestor  F0. An high-CA0, low-K0 or T-sensor-bias-high can all cause CA to
deviate high,.  Low-K0 and T-sensor-bias-high are not distinguishable from the SDG.
Variable CA0 can only be eliminated if it meets the latter of the following two
alternative conditions.
• If the temperature process is open loop stable or has an even number of open loop
unstable poles, then the high-CA0 will cause the same deviations as T-sensor-bias-
high so the high-CA0 fault can not be separated. 
• If the temperature process includes an odd number of open loop unstable poles,
the deviations caused by the high-CA0 contradict with the deviations caused by T-
sensor-bias-high so the high-CA0 can be removed.  
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Fault 3: F-sensor-bias-low.  Similar to an L-sensor-bias, this can cause both the level
and the flow rate control systems to deviate.  The interaction between these two
control systems is of Type A, but they have opposite effects so that L-sensor-bias and
F-sensor-bias can be separated either by Table 8 or by applying the alternative fault
isolation method in Section 5
Fault 4: FJ-sensor-bias-low.  FJ sensor is located in the inner loop of the temperature
cascade control system. According to the previous cause-effect knowledge, if only
outer loop controller deviates, inner loop sensor bias is the fault and the sensor bias
has the same direction as the deviation of that sensor measurement.
Fault 5: LV-valve-bias-high.  A valve bias only causes its own control system to
deviate.  The fault candidate from Figure 22 is {LV-valve-bias-high, an unknown
disturbance of L}. If Figure 23 is available, the unknown disturbance can be replaced
with low F1MAX.
Fault 6: FV-valve-bias-high. Similar to Fault 5; the fault candidate from Figure 22 is
{FV-valve-bias-high, an unknown disturbance of F} and from Figure 23, the
unknown disturbance can be replaced with high FMAX. 
Fault 7:  FJV-valve-bias-low.  FJV valve is located in the inner loop of the
temperature cascade control system.  If only the inner loop controller deviates then the
fault relates to the inner loop.  The fault candidate set is {FJV-valve-bias, an unknown
disturbance of FJ}. If Figure 23 is known, the unknown disturbance can be replaced
with FJMAX. Fault directions can be inferred as {FJV-valve-bias-low, low-FJMAX} by
the inner controller deviation. 
Faults 8 to 10: low-F1MAX, low-FJMAX, low-FMAX. Similar to Fault 5 to Fault 7, these
three faults cannot be separated from the related valve bias.
Fault 11: low-F0.  If F0 is low, both the level and the temperature control systems
deviate. CA deviates as well. From Figure 22 it can be seen a common disturbance of
L, T and CA must be the cause of these effects. If Figure 23 is known, F0 can then be
isolated because the flow rate control system doesn’t deviate and F0 is the only
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common ancestor of level and temperature control systems.  The direction of F0 can
be determined from either the deviation in the level or the temperature controller
outputs.
Fault 12: low-K0.  Both the outer and the inner loop controllers of the temperature
control system will deviate, as will CA. Based on the control loop deviations and
Figure 22, initially the fault candidate set is {T-sensor-bias-high, high-CA, an
unknown common disturbance of T and CA}. If Figure 23 is known, the common
disturbance can then be replaced with K or K0, and the high-CA can be replaced with
high-CA0. Flow rate F0 is not included in the fault candidate set because it is the
ancestor of L that doesn’t deviate.  Further separation depends on the stability of the
open loop process:
• if the temperature process is open loop stable or has an even number of open loop
unstable poles, the controller deviations caused by the high-CA0 and T-sensor-
bias-high contradict leaving low K0; 
• if the temperature process has an odd number of open loop unstable poles, the
controller deviations caused by high CA0 contradict, so the fault candidate shrinks
to {low-K0, T-sensor-bias-high}. 
Fault 13: high-CA0. Concentration CA will be high and both the outer and the inner
loop controllers of the temperature control system will deviate. The same arguments
hold as for Fault 12 so the candidate set shrinks to be {high-CA0, low-K0, T-sensor-
bias-high}. Again further separation depends on the stability of the open loop process:
• if the temperature process is open loop stable or has an even number of open loop
unstable poles, the three elements cannot be separated;
• if the temperature process has an odd number of open loop unstable poles, the
controller deviations caused by T-sensor-bias-high contradict, so the fault
candidate shrinks to {low-K0, high-CA0}. 
Fault 14: low-U0.  Both controllers in the temperature cascade control system deviate.
Because the other two control systems and CA don’t deviate, from Figure 22, the fault
must  be from, an unknown disturbance of T. If Figure 23 is known, the unknown
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disturbance can be replaced with T0, U0, TJ0. However these three disturbances can
not be separated if there is no further information. 
7. CONCLUSIONS
A self-validating control system (SEVACS) based approach to plant fault detection
and diagnosis has been proposed that enables the distribution of these tasks
throughout a plant.  The approach itself is targeted on control systems that inherently
eliminate steady state error; it is modular, steady state based, requires very little
process specific information and should therefore be attractive to control system’s
implementers who seek economies of scale.  Considerable effort has been expended
to ensure that the approach is applicable to virtually all types of linear or weakly non-
linear plant, whether they are open loop stable or not, have a type number of zero or
not and so on.
The approach is founded on the application of control systems theory to single and
cascade control systems with integral action.  This results in the derivation of cause-
effect knowledge and fault isolation procedures that take into account factors like
interactions between control systems, and the availability of non-control-loop-based
sensors.  Cause-effect knowledge can be represented by a number of tables.  Two
fault isolation procedures are needed, the more efficient should be suitable for most
processes with the exception of those with type numbers greater than zero.  Blatantly
obvious faults like sticking valves are not accommodated, but these can easily be
detected and isolated using a simple rule-base, which can also be distributed to the
FDD modules.
The approach has been tested on a simulated CSTR successfully; 14 faults have been
examined in all.  All faults have been identified and most of them have been isolated.
The approach is thought to be superior to traditional SDG-based fault diagnosis
methods because of its ease of implementation.  As such, it is very attractive. 
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Although beyond the scope of this paper, its applicability has been demonstrated on
the 24-loop Kodak Eastman benchmark (Chen & Howell, 2000).
As for the approach’s general applicability, clearly considerable effort would be
required to examine the many different situations that exist on real plants.  A
disturbance can result from internal or external influences, such as material
contamination, mechanical failure or mal-operation.  Changes in operating point and
throughput can also be viewed as disturbances.  The extent to which these might be
diagnosed would depend on the extent to which they affect the steady state and on the
knowledge that is available to facilitate their isolation.  For instance, the approach
would not be able to detect the presence of a sensor bias if it existed at the time the
plant was started up.   Although weakly non-linear processes have been examined in
some detail, the paper has avoided to mention strongly non-linear processes.  This is
partly because the concept of steady state might now be different (e.g. as a result of
limit cycle oscillations) and partly because the authors haven’t looked at this area
because it would be such a major task.  Similarly the dynamic situation has been
avoided.  For instance the extent to which the approach can be modified to
accommodate plants, which are required to slowly track or have over-ride control
schemes, has not been examined. Our suspicions are that the difficulty, once again,
would be more to do with the existence and identification of some form of quasi-
steady state, than to revising the approach to accommodate these ‘special cases’. 
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